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COMMENTARIES
ACCRUAL OF CAUSES OF ACTION IN VIRGINIA
James W. Ellerman *
I. INTRODUCTION
Black's Law Dictionary defines "accrue" to mean "[tlo come into
existence as an enforceable claim or right" or "to arise."1 Black's
further notes that "'[t]he term "accrue" in the context of a cause of
action means to arrive, to commence, to come into existence, or to
become a present enforceable demand or right. The time of ac-
crual of a cause of action is a question of fact."'2 In civil practice a
determination of the time of accrual must precede any discussion
of statutes of limitations.3 As prescribed by Virginia Code section
8.01-230, "[The right of action shall be deemed to accrue and the
prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the date the
injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person or damage
to property" or "when the breach of contract occurs in actions ex
contractu."4
* Associate, Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, LLP, Roanoke, Virginia. B.A., 2001, Col-
lege of William and Mary; J.D., 2005, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 21 (8th ed. 2004).
2. Id. (quoting 2 ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, CALIFORNIA AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES § 25:3,
at 17-18 (2d ed. 1996)).
3. W. HAMILTON BRYSON, BRYSON ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 255 (3d ed. 1997)
("The time limit of a statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues
to the plaintiff.").
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006). As Sinclair and
Middleditch note, it is important to recognize that Virginia Code section 8.01-230 provides
only a general rule for accrual, and it may be superseded by specific statutory provisions
with their own statutes of limitations. KENT SINCLAIR & LEIGH B. MIDDLEDITCH, JR.,
VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.9, at 225 n.201 (3d ed. 1998) (citing actions under the Vir-
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This article will examine major issues in Virginia law affecting
the accrual of causes of action, specifically in the contexts of con-
tract, tort, and property. In addition to surveying the basic ac-
crual requirements for each area of law, this article will look
more deeply into several specific issues that guide an accrual
analysis-particularly the distinction between causes and rights
of action, as well as the continuous treatment, discovery, and eco-
nomic loss rules.
II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CAUSE OF ACTION
AND RIGHT OF ACTION
The general accrual rules of Virginia Code section 8.01-230
specify that the "right of action" accrues, and the statute of limi-
tations begins to run, at the point of injury, property damage, or
contract breach. 5 In contrast, numerous other Virginia Code sec-
tions setting the statutes of limitations for specific actions refer
not to the accrual of the "right of action," but instead to the ac-
crual of the "cause of action."6 While courts in other jurisdictions
have suggested that the two terms are synonymous,7 the distinc-
tion between cause of action and right of action seems to exist in
Virginia case law.' If there is such an established distinction in
ginia Securities Act and actions for the enforcement of construction bonds as examples).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
6. See, e.g., id. § 8.01-243(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006) ("Unless otherwise
provided... every action for personal injuries... and every action for damages resulting
from fraud, shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.") (empha-
sis added); id. § 8.01-243(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006) ("Every action for injury
to property... shall be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues.") (em-
phasis added); id. § 8.01-244(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006) ("[I]f a person enti-
tled to bring an action for personal injury dies as a result of such injury with no such ac-
tion pending before the expiration of two years next after the cause of action shall have
accrued, then an action under § 8.01-50 [wrongful death] may be commenced .. ") (em-
phasis added); Id. § 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006) ("[Ajctions founded
upon a contract.., shall be brought within the following number of years next after the
cause of action shall have accrued. . . .") (emphasis added).
7. See, e.g., 1 AM. JUR. 2DActions § 2 (2005); see also Brungard v. Hartman, 405 A.2d
1089, 1092 n.7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979). As Pennsylvania courts have explained, "Cause of
action and right of action have the same meaning." Id. (citing Alpha Claude Neon Corp. v.
Pa. Distilling Co., 188 A. 825, 826 (Pa. 1936)). Moreover, "[iun the case of a tort, the cause
or right of action is the negligent act or acts which occasioned the injury." Id. (citing Smith
v. Fenner, 161 A.2d 150, 154-55 n.3 (Pa. 1960)).
8. See 1A MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA Actions § 3, at
191-92 (2004) ("Although the two terms are often used interchangeably, the distinction
between 'cause of action' and 'right of action' is recognized by the courts, and it has sub-
stantial foundation in reason.").
[Vol. 41:15
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Virginia jurisprudence, there is question as to the practical effi-
cacy of maintaining the delineation between the cause of action
and the right of action.9
A. The Cause of Action
Ultimately, the importance of the distinction between the cause
of action and the right of action is most relevant when determin-
ing the running of a statute of limitations. Under Virginia Code
section 8.01-230, the applicable statute of limitations begins to
run at the time the right of action accrues.1 ° As previously dis-
cussed, however, a right of action will not arise absent a pre-
existing cause of action. 1 Therefore, while the relevant Code pro-
visions speak to the right of action, it is essential to first examine
the elements of a cause of action. The cause of action is the act or
omission that constitutes the violation of the duty complained
of. 12 As the court has repeatedly held, "The essential elements of
a good cause of action ... are [1] a legal obligation of a defendant
to the plaintiff, [2] a violation or breach of that right or duty, and
[31 a consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff."13 Each ele-
ment is essential, and "[a] cause of action does not evolve unless
all of these factors are present."14
9. Questions have also arisen as to the constitutional validity of maintaining a dis-
tinction between causes and rights of action. As the Supreme Court of Virginia noted in
Harbour Gate Owners Ass'n v. Berg, 232 Va. 98, 348 S.E.2d 252 (1986), "[Iun a property
damage case where the breach of duty precedes the resulting injury or damage, the prop-
erty owner's right to sue may be barred before his property suffers any injury or damage."
Id. at 107 n.3, 348 S.E.2d at 258 n.3. Based on the court's admonition that if Virginia Code
section 8.01-230 is applied to bar a plaintiffs claim before the claim ever arises, violations
of both the Virginia and federal due process clauses may result. See MacLellan v. Throck-
morton, 235 Va. 341, 345, 367 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1988). For further discussion of this poten-
tial constitutional issue, see Letter from J. Gray Lawrence, Jr., Esquire, Faggert & Frei-
den, P.C., to Wiley F. Mitchell, Jr., Esquire, Wilcox & Savage, P.C. (Aug. 5, 2004)
[hereinafter Boyd-Graves Letter] (reporting the findings of a committee authorized by the
2004 Boyd-Graves Conference to research the right of action/cause of action distinction)
(on file with author).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
11. Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 13, 168 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1969).
12. Seymour v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709, 713, 75 S.E.2d 77, 80 (1953) (citing State ex
rel. Maynard v. Jarett, 110 S.E. 568, 569 (W. Va. 1922)); see also BRYSON, supra note 3, at
255 ("The cause of action accrues when the defendant does or leaves undone whatever it is
that subjects him to liability.").
13. Caudill, 210 Va. at 13, 168 S.E.2d at 259; see also Sides v. Richard Mach. Works,
Inc., 406 F.2d 445, 446 (4th Cir. 1969); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 957,
275 S.E.2d 900, 904 (1981).
14. Locke, 221 Va. at 957, 275 S.E.2d at 904.
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It is important to note that, while there is some authority to
the contrary,15 it is not the wrongful act that triggers a cause of
action, but rather the existence of some injury, damage, or loss.'6
"Damage," the court has held, "is an essential element of a cause
of action. Without some injury or damage, however slight, a cause
of action cannot accrue." 7 Therefore, where there has been no ac-
tual injury to the plaintiff, there is no recognizable cause of ac-
tion."8 Conversely, where an injury or loss, no matter how slight,
is sustained due to the defendant's wrongful acts, and the law
provides a remedy for the plaintiffs damage, a cause of action is
deemed to have arisen.
B. The Right of Action
As discussed above, Virginia Code section 8.01-230 looks to the
accrual of the right of action as the point at which the running of
the statute of limitations commences. "A right of action cannot
accrue," however, "until there is a cause of action." 9 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia has held that "'[a] right of action is the
right to presently enforce a cause of action-a remedial right af-
fording redress for the infringement of a legal right belonging to
some definite person."'2 As one commentator explains, "The stat-
ute begins to run when a party has a right to sue, that is, when
15. See First Va. Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 82, 301 S.E.2d 8, 14 (1983) (not-
ing the defendant's misplaced reliance on Virginia Military Institute v. King, 217 Va. 751,
232 S.E.2d 895 (1977), and Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Laburnum
Corp., 195 Va. 827, 80 S.E.2d 574 (1954)).
16. See, e.g., Locke, 221 Va. at 957-58, 275 S.E.2d at 904. But see Street v. Consumers
Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 572, 39 S.E.2d 271, 275 (1946) (noting that, in a wrongful
death context, the "cause of action ... is not the death itself, but the tort which produces
the death"); Sarver v. Prud'homme, 67 Va. Cir. 315, 317-18 (Cir. Ct. 2005) (Roanoke City)
("The death of Mr. Sarver, although a prerequisite to a wrongful death claim, cannot be
the cause of action because the death itself involved no act or omission that establishes
negligence.").
17. Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 520, 352 S.E.2d 327, 332 (1987).
18. Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C., 264 Va. 310, 313, 568 S.E.2d 693,
695 (2002). The Supreme Court of Virginia has construed "injury" to mean "positive,
physical or mental hurt to the claimant, not legal wrong to him in the broad sense that his
legally protected interests have been invaded." Locke, 221 Va. at 957, 275 S.E.2d at 904.
"Thus," the court notes, "the running of the time is tied to the fact of harm to the plaintiff,
without which no cause of action would come into existence; it is not keyed to the date of
the wrongful act, another ingredient of a personal injury cause of action." Id. at 957-58,
275 S.E.2d at 904.
19. Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 13, 168 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1969).
20. First Va. Bank-Colonial, 225 Vai at 81, 301 S.E.2d at 13 (quoting 1 AM. JUR. 2D
Actions § 2 (1962)).
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there has been a breach of duty, or a violation of a contract, giv-
ing rise to a cause of action."21 Since no cause of action accrues
until there is some cognizable damage to the plaintiffs person or
interest, 22 and no right of action can arise until there is a cause of
action, there can be no right of action until there is injury. As the
court has explained: "'A right of action cannot accrue until there
is a cause of action .... In the absence of injury or damage to a
plaintiff or his property, he has no cause of action and no right of
action can accrue to him.' 23
While the right of action triggers the running of the statute of
limitations, it is also the right of action that is terminated upon
conclusion of the statutory period. As the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia noted in Lewis'Administrator v. Glenn24 :
A cause of action is said to accrue to any person when that person
comes to a right to bring an action. There is, however, an obvious
distinction between a cause of action and a right, though a cause of
action generally confers a right. Thus statutes of limitation do not af-
fect the cause of action, but take away the right.
25
Stated otherwise, the statute of limitations has no effect on the
cause of action, which is simply the factual basis giving rise to the
plaintiffs right to seek a remedy at law. Instead, the statute of
limitations defines the time in which the plaintiff may pursue an
action at law to seek redress for the defendant's breach of duty,
either legal or contractual. As stated by the Supreme Court of
Virginia, "'[statutes of limitations] are designed to compel the
prompt assertion of an accrued right of action; not to bar such a
right before it has accrued.' 26
21. MARTIN P. BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN ACTIONS AT COMMON LAW § 210, at
350 (Clayton E. Williams & Martin P. Burks, III eds., 3d ed. 1934).
22. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
23. First Va. Bank-Colonial, 225 Va. at 82, 301 S.E.2d at 14 (quoting Caudill, 210 Va.
at 13, 168 S.E.2d at 259).
24. 84 Va. 947, 6 S.E. 866 (1888).
25. Id. at 949, 6 S.E. at 882 (quoting 1 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (14th ed.
1873)).
26. First Va. Bank-Colonial, 225 Va. at 83, 301 S.E.2d at 14 (quoting Caudill, 210 Va.
at 13, 168 S.E.2d at 259).
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C. Resolving the Distinction
The Supreme Court of Virginia has distinguished between the
cause of action and the right of action, holding that, while similar,
"the terms are not interchangeable."27 It is, in the court's words,
"a distinction with a difference."2" 'While a cause of action and a
right of action may accrue simultaneously," the court notes, "they
do not necessarily do so. Indeed, two separate rights of action
may arise from a single cause of action, and those rights may ac-
"129crue at different times.
1. Simultaneous Accrual
While the court's distinction between the cause and right of ac-
tion seems entrenched in Virginia case law, it is an unfounded
distinction that is inherently inconsistent. Moreover, maintaining
the distinction serves only to confound the already complex issues
of accrual and the running of statutes of limitations.3 ° Instead,
the court should recognize the term "right of action" simply as a
description of the statutory time period during which an ag-
grieved plaintiff may seek a remedy for a cause of action. Under
this view, the cause of action and the right of action will always
accrue simultaneously, and the statute of limitations will run
from that point of accrual to the point at which it severs the
plaintiffs right of action.
The essential determination for accrual questions, as stated
above, is when the cause of action accrues, as a cause of action
must exist before the right of action may accrue. Whether a spe-
cific case sounds in the law of tort, contract, or property, a cause
of action does not exist until there has been a breach of some duty
which proximately causes some degree of injury, harm, or loss to
27. Westminster Investing Corp. v. Lamps Unlimited, Inc., 237 Va. 543, 546 n.1, 379
S.E.2d 316, 318 n.1 (1989).
28. First Va. Bank-Colonial, 225 Va. at 81, 301 S.E.2d at 13. For a recent example of
the application of the "distinction with a difference" in a venue context, see Sarver v.
Prud'Homme, 67 Va. Cir. 315, 316-17 (Cir. Ct. 2005) (Roanoke City).
29. First Va. Bank-Colonial, 225 Va. at 81, 301 S.E.2d at 13 (emphasis added) (citing
Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. 1, 12, 52 S.E.2d 135, 140 (1949)).
30. As evidenced by the Sarver opinion, rendered by Judge Dorsey of the Roanoke
City Circuit Court, the unresolved distinction between causes of action and rights of action
has crossed into the context of Category B venue determinations.
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the plaintiff.31 While the court suggests that a right of action may
possibly accrue later than a cause of action,32 such a scenario
seems impossible (practically, if not also logically). Once a legal
obligation is owed the plaintiff by the defendant, and once that
duty or right is violated or breached, causing consequential injury
or damage to the plaintiff, a cause of action arises.3 3 Each ele-
ment of the cause of action is necessary and indispensable, thus
no cause of action can accrue until each is satisfied. If, as dis-
cussed above, a right of action cannot accrue until there is first a
cause of action, by implication a right of action also requires the
fulfillment of all the elements of the cause of action. Therefore,
the right of action, being based in the same elements required for
a cause of action, should spring into existence immediately upon
the cause of action's accrual. That is, upon the accrual of a cause
of action, a right of action, whose duration is determined by a
statute of limitations, also accrues and remains throughout the
statutorily prescribed period.
The same conclusion may be reached by looking to the text of
Virginia Code section 8.01-230, which states that the right of ac-
tion is deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period be-
gins to run from the time of contract breach, of damage to prop-
erty, or of personal injury.34 If the right of action accrues
immediately upon the plaintiffs injury or damage, as suggested
by the statute, then it must accrue simultaneously with the cor-
responding cause of action. Damage, by the language of Virginia
Code section 8.01-230, is a necessary prerequisite of the right of
action; however, the cause of action is also a prerequisite of the
right of action.35 Once again, "A right of action cannot arise until
a cause of action exists."36 Damage, however, is also required for
the accrual of a cause of action.
31. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495, 504, 593 S.E.2d 319, 324 (2004) (noting
that the determinative issue was whether "the [plaintiff's] right of action came into exis-
tence simultaneously with their cause of action or whether it accrued at another time").
33. See Westminster Investing Corp. v. Lamps Unlimited, Inc., 237 Va. 543, 546, 379
S.E.2d 316, 317 (1989).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006); see also Laguna v.
Wallace, 67 Va. Cir. 535, 538 (Cir. Ct. 2004) (Loudoun County).
35. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
36. Laguna, 67 Va. Cir. at 538 (citing Stone v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 232 Va. 365, 368, 350
S.E.2d 629, 631 (1986)).
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Placing the pieces in order, it becomes clear that the right of
action must accrue contemporaneously with the cause of action.
First, there must be a duty, contractual or legal, owed by the de-
fendant to the plaintiff. Second, there must be some breach or vio-
lation of that duty by the defendant. Finally, some damage or in-
jury must be caused by the defendant's breach of duty.
Immediately upon the suffering of loss, damage, or injury, all of
the elements will be satisfied and a cause of action will accrue to
the plaintiff. Likewise, as the cause of action has accrued and
damage has occurred, the right of action will also immediately ac-
crue and trigger the running of the statute of limitations.
2. Harbour Gate and Misinterpretation
Much of the confusion surrounding the distinction between the
cause of action and the right of action stems from the Supreme
Court of Virginia's holding in Harbour Gate Owners' Ass'n v.
Berg,37 wherein the court suggests that a right of action may ac-
crue after a cause of action and before any injury or damage is
suffered by the plaintiff.3" The Harbour Gate opinion not only il-
lustrates the complexity of the distinction, but also highlights the
inherent flaw of dogmatic adherence to past holdings, or stare de-
cisis. In striving to maintain an unnecessary distinction between
the cause and the right of action, the Harbour Gate court reaches
a conclusion that is correct in result, but unsound in theory.
The issue in Harbour Gate concerned the accrual of a cause and
right of action for damages to property and a breach of warranty.
In 1973, the developers of the Harbour Gate Condominiums in
Virginia Beach began construction of the buildings, which
reached substantial completion in 1975. 3' The first residential
units were sold in 1976, with approximately 120 more units sold
through 1978.40 The deeds through which the units were con-
veyed contained no express warranties, but were ultimately cov-
ered by the Condominium Act, which became effective in July
1974.41 The Condominium Act contained specific warranty provi-
37. 232 Va. 98, 348 S.E.2d 252 (1986); see also Boyd-Graves Letter, supra note 9, at 2.
38. Harbour Gate, 232 Va. at 107, 348 S.E.2d at 258 ("The statute of limitations began
to run as to his claim 'when the breach of contract or duty occur [red].").
39. Id. at 100, 348 S.E.2d at 254.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
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sions mandating warranties or guarantees against structural de-
fects in condominium units and common elements for a period of
two years.42 In April 1978, residents discovered damage to the
roof of the condominium. 3 Alleging that the defective roof
breached the Condominium Act's statutory warranties, the plain-
tiffs filed suit for damages against the developer, architects, con-
tractors, and subcontractors.44 The developers filed a plea assert-
ing that the statute of limitations had passed, thus cutting off the
plaintiffs' right of action in the case.45 The Virginia Beach City
Circuit Court, ultimately sustaining the defendants' plea, held
that the plaintiffs' right of action for breach of warranty had ac-
crued when the first condominium unit was sold in 1976 and that
this case, having been filed more than three years after that time,
was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. 6 The
Supreme Court of Virginia then granted the plaintiffs' appeal
from the order sustaining the plea.
4 7
In addressing the trial court's ruling on the statute of limita-
tions, the Supreme Court of Virginia began by noting that the
statutory two-year warranty period was not a statute of limita-
tions, but merely the period in which a cause of action for a
breach of that warranty may accrue. 4' As the court explained: "If
a breach occurs before the two-year warranty expires, a cause of
action accrues. If a person suffers damage or injury as a result of
the breach, a right of action accrues to him."49 The court correctly
reasoned that, in order to determine the duration of such a right
of action, it must look to the applicable statute of limitations.5
Ultimately concluding that Virginia Code section 8.01-246(4)'s
three-year limitations period had been correctly applied in the
court below, the Supreme Court of Virginia then turned its atten-
tion to the question of when the right of action actually accrued."1
42. Harbour Gate, 232 Va. at 101, 348 S.E.2d at 254 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
79.79(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
43. Id., 348 S.E.2d at 255.
44. Id. at 101-02, 348 S.E.2d at 255.
45. Id. at 102, 348 S.E.2d at 255.
46. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(4) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006) (gov-
erning contracts not in writing, as the applicable statute)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 105, 348 S.E.2d at 257.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 105-06, 348 S.E.2d at 257.
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Citing past opinions, the court began by reiterating that, just
as in actions for personal injury, in actions for damage to prop-
erty, "where a breach of duty preceded damage to property rights,
a right of action did not accrue to the property owner until his
property suffered damage or injury."52 The court then turned to
Virginia Code section 8.01-230, which at the time, read as follows:
In every action for which a limitation period is prescribed, the cause
of action shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation pe-
riod shall begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in the
case of injury to the person, when the breach of contract or duty oc-
curs in the case of damage to property and not when the resulting
damage is discovered... .3
In light of the statutory provision, the court observed that
while the accrual rules for personal injury actions remain un-
changed, the effect on actions for damage to property was sub-
stantial.54 For plaintiffs who had purchased deeds after section
8.01-230 became effective, the court ruled that the statute of limi-
tations began to run in 1976, when the breach of contract or duty
occurred, rather than in 1978, when the actual damage was dis-
covered.55 In a concluding note, the court sought to defend a hold-
ing it considered unfair by citing its obligation to follow the law:
It seems unlikely that the revisors [of Virginia Code section 8.01-
230] intended the harsh result dictated by its clear language: in a
property damage case where the breach of duty precedes the result-
ing injury or damage, the property owner's right to sue may be
barred before his property suffers any injury or damage. Indeed, as
here, any right of action may be barred before he becomes an owner
of the property. It is not our function to amend the law, however, and
we must leave to the General Assembly any consideration of
change. 56
The most significant concern with the Harbour Gate decision
has since been resolved through changes to Virginia Code section
52. Id. at 106, 348 S.E.2d at 257 (reviewing First Va. Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va.
72, 82-83, 301 S.E.2d 8, 14 (1983)).
53. Id., 348 S.E.2d at 257-58. It is important to note that the version of Virginia Code
section 8.01-230 relied on by the Harbour Gate court uses the term "cause of action,"
whereas now the statute starts the running of the statute of limitations at the accrual of
the right of action. "Over the years, the statute was amended to expand its application to
actions ex contractu generally, not merely to those involving property damage, and to sub-
stitute 'right of action' for 'cause of action.'" Boyd-Graves Letter, supra note 9, at 1.
54. Harbour Gate, 232 Va. at 106, 348 S.E.2d at 258.
55. Id. at 107, 348 S.E.2d at 258.
56. Id. at 107 n.3, 348 S.E.2d at 258 n.3.
[Vol. 41:15
CAUSES OF ACTION IN VIRGINIA
8.01-230. Whereas then the statute did provide that a cause of ac-
tion for damage to property accrued only at the time of the breach
of duty, it has since been amended to provide that the limitations
period "begin[s] to run from the date the injury is sustained in the
case of injury to the person or damage to property."5 A flaw re-
mains, however, in the court's interpretation of the terms "cause
of action" and "right of action" and their individual significance.
Relying wholly on the language of Virginia Code section 8.01-230,
the court ruled that the cause of action accrued when the breach
of duty occurred, avoiding any discussion of the previously re-
quired prerequisite of damage or injury. As a result, some have
construed the Harbour Gate decision, even after the most recent
amendments to Virginia Code section 8.01-230, to imply that a
right of action can accrue before any damage, injury, or loss is
suffered.58 Had the court decided the case based on its past hold-
ings related to causes and rights of action, rather than solely on
the language of the statute, such questions could likely have been
avoided, though the same outcome would have resulted.
In 1954, in the case of Richmond Redevelopment & Housing
Authority v. Laburnum Construction Corp., the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that the plaintiffs cause of action arose at the
time of the breach of warranty-when defective work was done-
and not at the time of extensive property damage.6" The court so
held because, at the time of breach, the plaintiffs property had
been damaged to some calculable degree, which the court classi-
fied as consequential damages.6' In support of its decision, the
court noted that:
[Wihere an injury, though slight, is sustained in consequence of the
wrongful or negligent act of another and the law affords a remedy
therefor the statute of limitations attaches at once. It is not material
that all the damages resulting from the act should have been sus-
tained at that time and the running of the statute [of limitations] is
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
58. See Wright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 Va. Cir. 485, 490 (Cir. Ct. 2004) (Portsmouth
City); see also 12A MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA Limitation
of Actions § 23, at 337 (2002); Boyd-Graves Letter, supra note 9, at 3 (suggesting that the
current statutory language should be changed so as to avoid the problems illustrated in
Harbour Gate, "i.e., commencement of the running of the statute of limitations before an
injury ha[s] occurred").
59. 195 Va. 827, 80 S.E.2d 574 (1954).
60. Id. at 836-39, 80 S.E.2d at 580-81.
61. Id. at 836, 80 S.E.2d at 580.
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not postponed by the fact that the actual or substantial damages do
not occur until a later date.
62
Likewise, in 1928 the Supreme Court of Virginia held in Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. v. Saltzer,63 that:
Whenever any injury, however slight it may be, is complete at the
time the [act or omission] is completed, the cause of action then ac-
crues; but, whenever the [act or omission] is not legally injurious,
there is no cause of action until such injurious conse uences occur,
and it accrues at the time of such consequential injury.
In Harbour Gate, as in Laburnum Construction and Saltzer,
significant injury occurred long after the initial breach of contract
or warranty. Nonetheless, as these earlier precedents make clear,
there is sufficient loss to the plaintiff at the time of breach, that
is, the delivery of a defective product or the defective completion
of work, to qualify as "damage" for the purposes of accrual. As in
Laburnum Construction, the requisite damage need not be catas-
trophic. Therefore, the court's (and others') fear that "in a prop-
erty damage case where the breach of duty precedes the resulting
injury or damage, the property owner's right to sue may be barred
before his property suffers any injury or damage" 5 is misplaced.
Regardless of the wording of Virginia Code section 8.01-230, the
same result is reached. The plaintiffs cause of action for damage
to property arising from a breach of warranty may accrue upon
delivery or conveyance of the defective property. Taking into ac-
count the foregoing discussion of the distinction between the
cause and right of action, therefore, the two will arise contempo-
raneously, since there is both a cause of action and calculable
damage.
3. Statutory Inconsistency
As mentioned earlier, the Virginia Code is horribly inconsistent
in its use of the terms "cause of action" and "right of action," 6
62. Id. at 839, 80 S.E.2d at 581 (quoting Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va.
561, 566, 39 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1946)).
63. 151 Va. 165, 144 S.E. 456 (1928).
64. Id. at 171, 144 S.E. at 457, quoted in Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951,
960, 275 S.E.2d 900, 906 (1981).
65. Harbour Gate Owners' Ass'n v. Berg, 232 Va. 98, 107 n.3, 348 S.E.2d 252, 258 n.3
(1986).
66. See supra note 6.
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thus contributing to the confusion over their respective mean-
ings.67 Specifically with regard to contract actions, Virginia Code
section 8.01-246 provides that the statute of limitations begins
with the accrual of the cause of action,68 whereas Virginia Code
section 8.01-230 looks to the accrual of the right of action.69 If one
adopts the view that the right of action accrues contemporane-
ously with the cause of action and serves only to define the period
in which one can seek a remedy, such statutory inconsistencies
are only of clerical concern.
Virginia Code section 8.01-246 states that "actions founded
upon a contract ... shall be brought within the following number
of years next after the cause of action shall have accrued." ° Fol-
lowing the preceding analysis, the cause of action will accrue
upon a breach of a contractual duty proximately causing damage
or loss to the plaintiff. 1 At that time, the right of action will also
accrue, as its two prerequisites, the cause of action and damage,
will exist. Therefore, implicit in the words "after the cause of ac-
tion shall have accrued" is the understanding that the right of ac-
tion will spring from the accrued cause of action and will last un-
til it is cut off by the applicable statute of limitations.
Conversely, Virginia Code section 8.01-230 prescribes the point
at which "the right of action shall be deemed to accrue and the
prescribed limitations period shall begin to run."72 Similar to sec-
tion 8.01-246, Virginia Code section 8.01-230 carries with it cer-
tain implied language. Implicit in its text is the understanding
that before the right of action can accrue and the statutory time
can begin to run, there must first be an accrued cause of action
and some measure of damage or loss suffered by the plaintiff. "
67. See Boyd-Graves Letter, supra note 9, at 3 ("The Committee believes that the con-
flict between Code §§ 8.01-246 and 8.01-230 needs resolving, especially in view of the Su-
preme Court's past decisions holding that Code § 8.01-230 may apply to bar a claim before
there is an injury.").
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
69. Id. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
70. Id. § 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
71. See Brown v. Harms, 251 Va. 301, 306, 467 S.E.2d 805, 807 (1996).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
73. See id.
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D. Conclusion
If courts and scholars will accept the view that the cause of ac-
tion and right of action accrue simultaneously, there is no press-
ing need, beyond only an aesthetic desire for consistency, to un-
dertake major revisions of Title 8.01 of the Virginia Code. To
achieve consistency, however, the Supreme Court of Virginia
must speak to the cause of action/right of action distinction with
some measure of finality. As shown above, there is an ample
foundation in both the Virginia Code and Virginia common law
upon which the court could hold that "right of action" simply de-
scribes the period of time in which a litigant may seek a remedy
for a cause of action. Nonetheless, the distinction is ultimately a
matter more of academic and logical significance than of practical
relevance. In practice, the Virginia lawyer should continue to look
to the cause of action-the breach of duty proximately causing in-
jury-in determining whether to file suit and when the applicable
statute of limitations will bar his or her client's legal remedy.
III. CONTRACT VERSUS TORT AND THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE
The distinction between contract and tort arises often when
parties seek to determine whether a cause of action has accrued
and which statute of limitations will apply to the particular ac-
tion at issue. This problem most often arises in products liabili-
ty74 and in professional liability actions. 5  In determining
whether a cause of action is more appropriately deemed tort or
contract, courts look sometimes to the source of the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff and other times to the nature of the loss, in-
jury, or damage sustained by the plaintiff. The economic loss rule,
often applied in property damage cases, may serve to resolve in-
consistencies that arise in the duty-based analysis employed in
professional liability actions.
74. See, e.g., Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 374
S.E.2d 55 (1988).
75. See, e.g., Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495, 593 S.E.2d 319 (2004); Oleyar v. Kerr,
217 Va. 88, 225 S.E.2d 398 (1976).
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A. The Economic Loss Rule
The case of Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects,
Inc." provides the best example of Virginia's use of the economic
loss rule to distinguish causes of action arising in tort from those
arising in contract. In Sensenbrenner, the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants' negligent design, supervision, and construction of
a swimming pool on their property caused water pipes to break,
leading to extensive damage to a house next to the pool.77 In re-
sponse to the plaintiffs' allegations, the defendants asserted that
the action was barred because the plaintiffs claimed damages for
only economic loss and thus could not recover in tort because of a
lack of privity."8
Virginia Code section 8.01-223 provides that "where recovery of
damages for injury to person, including death, or to property re-
sulting from negligence is sought, lack of privity between the par-
ties shall be no defense."79 In Blake Construction Co. v. Alley," °
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that since section 8.01-223 is
limited only to cases involving injury to persons or property, it
has no application in actions where plaintiffs seek damages for
purely economic losses."1 Therefore, the dispute in Sensenbrenner
turned entirely on whether the plaintiffs' claims were for injuries
to their property or, rather, for purely economic loss.
2
As the Supreme Court of Virginia noted in Sensenbrenner, the
majority of courts "equate economic losses, for which no action in
tort will lie, with disappointed economic expectations," 3 where
"goods purchased fail to meet some standard of quality." 4 Fur-
ther illustrating the distinction, the court turned to the law of
products liability, explaining that "when a product 'injures itself
because one of its component parts is defective, a purely economic
loss results to the owner for which no action in tort will lie." 5 Cit-
76. 236 Va. 419, 374 S.E.2d 55 (1988).
77. Id. at 422, 374 S.E.2d at 56.
78. Id.
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
80. 233 Va. 31, 353 S.E.2d 724 (1987).
81. Id. at 34, 353 S.E.2d at 727.
82. Sensenbrenner, 236 Va. at 423, 374 S.E.2d at 57.
83. Id. (citing Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982), as an example).
84. Id. (citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982)).
85. Id. at 424, 374 S.E.2d at 57 (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica De-
laval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986)).
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ing the Supreme Court of the United States, the court observed
that if tort law applied to such cases sounding in contract, "'con-
tract law would drown in a sea of tort,"'' 6 and attorneys would
always turn to tort to avoid the more restrictive limits of contract
damages.8 7 "The law of torts," the court observed, "is well
equipped to offer redress for losses suffered by reason of a 'breach
of some duty imposed by law to protect the broad interests of so-
cial policy."'8 8 As the court continued:
Tort law is not designed, however, to compensate parties for losses
suffered as a result of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement.
That type of compensation necessitates an analysis of the damages
which were within the contemplation of the parties when framing
their agreement. It remains the particular province of the law of con-
tracts. 89
Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiffs had alleged
"nothing more than disappointed economic expectations"" and
that the defendants had assumed no duties beyond those imposed
on them by contract. 91
As shown above, while the court made mention of the source of
the duty involved, the dispositive factor in Sensenbrenner was the
characterization and pleading of damages. As the court con-
cluded, the damages caused to the plaintiffs' house, a part of their
property, constituted "a diminution in the value of the whole,
measured by the cost of repair."92 Employing the economic loss
rule, the court ultimately held that such damage "is a purely eco-
nomic loss, for which the law of contracts provides the sole rem-
edy. '93
86. Id. (quoting East River, 476 U.S. at 866).
87. Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 614 (4th
ed. 1971)). Conversely, the same rationale may apply to prevent parties from seeking to
place in the law of contract that which more appropriately belongs in the law of torts. See,
e.g., Glisson v. Loxley, 235 Va. 62, 366 S.E.2d 68 (1988).
88. Sensenbrenner, 236 Va. at 425, 374 S.E.2d at 58 (quoting Kamlar Corp. v. Haley,
224 Va. 699, 706, 299 S.E.2d 514, 517 (1983)).
89. Id. (citing Kamlar, 224 Va. at 706, 299 S.E.2d at 517).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
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B. The Duty Analysis and Actions for Professional Malpractice
As mentioned above, the contract-tort distinction is also rele-
vant in actions for professional malpractice. Whereas the eco-
nomic loss rule, most often employed in property damage cases,
focuses on the classification of the plaintiffs injuries, the focus of
the contract-tort distinction for professional malpractice is the
underlying duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant.
In this context, the distinction is most clearly illustrated in Vir-
ginia's treatment of legal malpractice actions. In 1976, in the case
of Oleyar v. Kerr,94 the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted the
view that "an action for the negligence of an attorney in the per-
formance of professional services, while sounding in tort, is an ac-
tion for breach of contract and thus governed by the statute of
limitations applicable to contracts."9" The court's holding in
Oleyar was based in large part on explanations of English prece-
dents found in Burks Pleading and Practice.96 As that treatise
explains:
The distinction is this: If the cause of complaint be for an act of omis-
sion or non-feasance which, without proof of a contract to do what
was left undone, would not give rise to any cause of action (because
no duty apart from contract to do what is complained of exists) then
the action is founded upon contract, and not upon tort. If, on the
other hand, the relation of the plaintiff and the defendants be such
that a duty arises from that relationship, irrespective of contract, to
take due care, and the defendants are negligent, then the action is
one of tort.
97
Since Oleyar, this view of legal malpractice as an action gov-
erned by contract statutes of limitations has been repeatedly up-
held in the commonwealth, 98 most recently in Shipman v.
Kruck.99 Citing other precedents, the Supreme Court of Virginia
noted in Shipman that "'[a] cause of action for legal malpractice
94. 217 Va. 88, 225 S.E.2d 398 (1976).
95. Id. at 90, 225 S.E.2d at 400.
96. See id., 225 S.E.2d at 399-400.
97. MARTIN P. BURKS, COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 234,
at 406 (T. Munford Boyd ed., 4th ed. 1952) (quoting Atlantic & Pacific R. Co. v. Laird, 164
U.S. 393, 399 (1896)).
98. See, e.g., MacLellan v. Throckmorton, 235 Va. 341, 344, 367 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1988)
("We adhere to the rule that actions for legal malpractice are governed by the limitation
periods applicable to actions for breach of contract.").
99. 267 Va. 495, 593 S.E.2d 319 (2004).
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requires the existence of an attorney-client relationship which
gave rise to a duty.""' Furthermore, the court noted, "it is the
contract [between attorney and client] that gives rise to the
duty." 1°1
C. The Economic Loss Rule in Professional Liability Actions
While it is clearly established in Virginia that legal malpractice
actions are to be governed by contract statutes of limitations, an
apparent inconsistency arises when one applies the court's ra-
tionale for this rule to cases for medical malpractice. To resolve
this conflict, it may be possible to employ the economic loss rule
to rationalize the use of a contract statute of limitations for legal
malpractice, an action ostensibly sounding in tort.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court of Virginia has long
held that legal malpractice actions are limited by contract stat-
utes of limitations because the cause of action's prerequisite duty
arises only from the agreement of the parties. Conversely, tort
causes of action, of which medical malpractice is one, require the
breach of some duty imposed on the defendant by operation of
law, wholly independent of the parties' dealings. Inconsistency
arises, however, when one considers Virginia's requirement that,
before a cause of action for medical malpractice can arise, there
must first be a physician-patient relationship. In Lyons v. Gre-
ther,'O2 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "[a] physician's
duty arises only upon the creation of a physician-patient relation-
ship; that relationship springs from a consensual transaction, a
contract, express or implied, general or special."' 3 Continuing,
the court further noted that "[w]hether a physician-patient rela-
tionship is created is a question of fact, turning upon a determi-
100. Id. at 501, 593 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly,
P.C., 264 Va. 310, 313, 568 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2002)).
101. Id. But see Lyle, Siegel, Croshaw & Beale, P.C. v. Tidewater Capital Corp., 249
Va. 426, 457 S.E.2d 28 (1995). In Tidewater Capital, the issue before the court was
whether a defendant in a legal malpractice action could employ the defense of contributory
negligence, traditionally reserved exclusively for tort causes of action. Id. at 431, 457
S.E.2d at 31. In allowing the use of the defense, the court held that '[wlith respect to con-
tributory negligence, we discern no logical reason for treating differently legal malpractice
and medical malpractice actions. Both are negligence claims, and actions against attor-
neys for negligence are governed by the same principles applicable to other negligence ac-
tions." Id. at 432, 457 S.E.2d at 32.
102. 218 Va. 630, 239 S.E.2d 103 (1977).
103. Id. at 633, 239 S.E.2d at 105 (emphasis added).
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nation whether the patient entrusted his treatment to the physi-
cian and the physician accepted the case." 4 Later in its opinion,
the court used more contract-sounding language to discuss the
termination of the physician's duty, noting that "the relationship
may be terminated earlier by mutual consent or by the unilateral
action of the patient."
10 5
This problem of inconsistency is compounded, however, by the
fact that an attorney's duties to his or her client may arise before
the formation of a contract between them. It is uniformly under-
stood that an attorney owes a duty of confidentiality to prospec-
tive clients, even those with whom he never enters into a contrac-
tual agreement to provide legal services. While the Supreme
Court of Virginia bases its accrual rules for legal malpractice on
the formation and breach of contractual duties, the problem of
prospective clients illustrates that the duty-based classification of
actions is not so simple. 106
The economic loss rule may serve to reconcile this apparent in-
consistency. In Sensenbrenner, the Supreme Court of Virginia ob-
served that:
The controlling policy consideration underlying tort law is the safety
of persons and property-the protection of persons and property from
losses resulting from injury. The controlling policy consideration un-
derlying the law of contracts is the protection of expectations bar-
gained for. If that distinction is kept in mind, the damages claimed
104. Id.
105. Id. at 634, 239 S.E.2d at 106.
106. See supra note 101. In Lyle, Siegel, Croshaw & Beale, P.C. v. Tidewater Capital
Corp., 249 Va. 426, 457 S.E.2d 28 (1995), the Supreme Court of Virginia made several
statements that would suggest uniform treatment of legal and medical malpractice claims.
See id. at 432, 457 S.E.2d at 32; see also Allied Prods., Inc. v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763,
764-65, 232 S.E.2d 774, 775 (1977). As the court notes in Tidewater Capital, "[T]he duty
upon the attorney to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence on behalf of the client
arises out of the relationship of the parties, irrespective of a contract, and the attorney's
breach of that duty, i.e., the appropriate standard of care, constitutes negligence." Tidewa-
ter Capital, 249 Va. at 432, 457 S.E.2d at 32. The court does not attempt to reconcile this
inherent contradiction in the Tidewater Capital decision. Nor does the later decision in
Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495, 593 S.E.2d 319 (2004), speak to the Tidewater Capital de-
cision or its rationale. It is perhaps possible to reconcile this problem by noting that the
Tidewater Capital holding, insofar as it applies a traditional duty and negligence formula
to legal malpractice cases, is limited in applicability only to the use of the contributory
negligence defense. See supra note 101. For the purposes of this analysis and a discussion
of statutes of limitations, the Shipman rationale should still control, as that decision was
limited in scope to the applicable limitations period for legal malpractice actions. Ship-
man, 267 Va. at 501, 593 S.E.2d at 322.
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in a particular case may more readily be classified between claims
for injuries to persons or property on one hand and economic losses
on the other."
107
Whereas tort damages seek to provide a remedy for the breach
of a duty "'to take care for the safety of the person or property of
another,""" contract damages seek to compensate parties for
purely economic losses. In attorney-client relationships, the par-
ties are fully able, at the time of the formation of the relationship
(whether or not it is ultimately ratified by contract) to determine
the measure of damages that would result from a breach of duty.
This predictability stems not from the source of the duty, but
rather from the nature of the damages the aggrieved client would
ultimately plead. The legal malpractice plaintiff does not seek re-
dress for an injury to himself or his property, but instead for the
disparity between the services he bargained for and those he ac-
tually received from his attorney. "That type of compensation,"
the court has observed, "necessitates an analysis of the damages
which were within the contemplation of the parties when framing
their agreement. It remains the particular province of the law of
contracts." 109 Conversely, when forming the physician-patient re-
lationship, the parties in a medical malpractice action could not
have foreseen the ultimate damages stemming from a missed di-
agnosis of melanoma or a botched gastric bypass procedure.
By employing a duty-based approach to apply the contract stat-
ute of limitations to legal malpractice actions, the Supreme Court
of Virginia has fashioned a legal distinction where there is no cor-
responding distinction in fact or in practice. Distinguishing the
two causes of action along economic loss lines, however, more
clearly justifies the distinction without resorting to the creation of
legal fiction.
107. Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 425, 374
S.E.2d 55, 58 (1988).
108. Id. (quoting Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 233 Va. 31, 34, 353 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1987)).
109. Id.
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IV. THE DISCOVERY RULE
A. Judicial Rejection of the Discovery Rule
Notwithstanding its application in a number of states, includ-
ing neighboring West Virginia, Virginia has repeatedly refused to
adopt a "discovery rule" to, as one commentator notes, "amelio-
rate the fate of the hapless victim of actionable conduct who can-
not learn of the injury he has suffered until after the limitation
period has run."11 The rationale for the rejection of the discovery
rule, which would set the commencement of the limitations period
at the date upon which the plaintiff knew or should have known
of his cause of action, stems largely from the court's historical
treatment of the damage prerequisite to a cause of action.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court of Virginia has repeat-
edly held that damage, no matter how slight, is an essential ele-
ment of a cause of action,'1 ' and "'[i]n the absence of any injury or
damage, there is no cause of action.""' 2 Furthermore, in evaluat-
ing the damage element of a cause of action, the court has held
that "it is immaterial whether all the damages resulting from the
negligent act were sustained at the time that act occurred."" 3
Rather, the running of a statute of limitations will not be delayed
by the fact that the bulk of the plaintiffs damages, injuries, or
losses did not occur until a later date. 1 4
In Virginia Military Institute v. King,"' the case most often
cited for the commonwealth's rejection of the discovery rule, the
Supreme Court of Virginia stated that:
We have followed the general rule that the applicable period of limi-
tation begins to run from the moment the cause of action arises
rather than from the time of discovery of injury or damage, and we
110. SINCLAIR & MIDDLEDITCH, supra note 4, § 4.10, at 232.
111. See Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 520, 352 S.E.2d 327, 332 (1987); Caudill v. Wise
Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 13, 168 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1969).
112. Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495, 502-03, 593 S.E.2d 319, 323 (2004) (quoting Rut-
ter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C., 264 Va. 310, 313, 568 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2002)).
113. Id. at 503, 593 S.E.2d at 323; see also Owens v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 257, 258 (E.D. Va. 1967) ("[If an injury occurs, even though it be ever so slight and
not capable of ascertainment at the time, the cause of action then accrues.").
114. See Richmond Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 195 Va. 827, 839,
80 S.E.2d 574, 581 (1954).
115. 217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977).
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have said that difficulty in ascertaining the existence of a cause of
action is irrelevant. 
116
Recognizing the potentially harsh outcome of such strict adher-
ence to a minimal injury standard, the court observed that "[tihe
inequities that may arise from the general rule which may trigger
a statute of limitations when the injury or damage is unknown or
difficult or even incapable of discovery are apparent."117 Nonethe-
less, the court in King refused to alter this firmly establish prece-
dent, asserting that "any change in a rule of law that has been
followed in our jurisdiction and relied on by bench and bar for so
many years should be made not by us, but by the General Assem-
bly, which thus far has not approved any modification.""'
Since the court's initial decision in King, it has since continued
its refusal to adopt a discovery rule." 9 Moreover, the court's def-
erence to the General Assembly on this matter is further
strengthened by the explicit language of Virginia Code section
8.01-230, which states that the statute of limitations will begin to
run "when the breach of contract occurs . . . not when the result-
ing damage is discovered."
120
B. Statutory Exceptions
While the Supreme Court of Virginia shows no sign of wavering
in its staunch denunciation of a generally applicable discovery
rule, the General Assembly has crafted a number of very limited
exceptions. One such statutory exception applies to occupational
116. Id. at 759, 232 S.E.2d at 900 (citing Laburnum, 195 Va. at 838, 80 S.E.2d at 580-
81). In refusing to adopt a discovery rule in King, the court noted several examples of
situations wherein it had adhered to the requirement that a cause of action accrues and a
statute of limitations begins upon injury. In Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187
(1966), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the cause of action accrued when a sur-
geon left a needle in the patient's neck, as opposed to when the physician's negligence was
discovered. Id. at 814, 146 S.E.2d at 190. Likewise, in Caudill, the supreme court held
that the statute of limitations began for a personal injury at the time of injury rather than
when the plaintiff purchased a vehicle whose defective condition caused the plaintiffs in-
jury. 210 Va. at 14-15, 168 S.E.2d at 260.
117. King, 217 Va. at 760, 232 S.E.2d at 900.
118. Id.
119. See Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495, 503, 593 S.E.2d 319, 323 (2004) ("Neverthe-
less, we concluded that it was the role of the General Assembly, not the judiciary, to
change a rule of law that has been relied upon by bench and bar for so long. We continue
to adhere to that principle.").
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
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disease claims. Under Virginia Code section 8.01-249(4), the
cause of action will be deemed to accrue "[i]n actions for injury to
the person resulting from exposure to asbestos or products con-
taining asbestos, when a diagnosis of asbestosis . .. or other dis-
abling asbestos-related injury or disease is first communicated to
the person or his agent by a physician." 121 Prior to the enactment
of section 8.01-249, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Locke v.
Johns-Manville Corp. 122 allowed the plaintiffs negligence action
for asbestos-related injuries to proceed, notwithstanding the fact
that his most recent exposure to asbestos occurred over five years
before he brought suit. 23 While the Locke decision prompted
some to assert that the court had created at least a quasi-
discovery rule, 24 the court unequivocally stated that it had not
done so. 125 Distinguishing the case from King and other decisions,
the court asserted that in Locke, there was no injury or damage at
the time of the wrongful act, thus no cause of action could accrue
at that point. 126 "A disease like this cancer," the court noted,
"must first exist before it is capable of causing injury. To hold
otherwise would result in the inequity of barring the meso-
thelioma plaintiffs cause of action before he sustains injury."127
Virginia Code section 8.01-249 also provides exceptions for "ac-
tions for fraud or mistake and in actions for rescission of con-
tract,"2 ' and for products liability actions arising from complica-
tions from "the implantation of any prosthetic device for breast
augmentation or reconstruction." 2 9 Furthermore, section 8.01-
249(6) provides an extension of time for personal injury actions,
regardless of the theory of recovery, when the cause of action
arises from an incident of childhood sexual abuse.' 30 Under this
provision, the cause of action is deemed to accrue, and the statute
121. Id. § 8.01-249(4) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
122. 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
123. Id. at 958-59, 275 S.E.2d at 905.
124. See Deborah Hutchins Combs, Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Occupational
Disease Cases: Is Locke v. Johns-Manville a Viable Alternative to the Discovery Rule?, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 263, 277 (1982).
125. Locke, 221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905 (noting that "the rule we have just articu-
lated is not a so-called 'discovery' rule, and plaintiff does not advocate that we embrace
such a theory").
126. Id., 275 S.E.2d at 906.
127. Id.
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(1) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
129. Id. § 8.01-249(8) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
130. Id. § 8.01-249(7) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
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of limitations begins to run, "when the fact of the injury and its
causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the
person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psycholo-
gist."1
31
The General Assembly has also created statutory exceptions
limited in applicability to actions against healthcare providers.
Virginia Code section 8.01-243(C)(1) grants an extension of the
normal two-year limitations period "[i]n cases arising out of a for-
eign object having no therapeutic or diagnostic effect being left in
a patient's body, for a period of one year from the date the object
is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered."'32 Simi-
larly, section 8.01-243(C)(2) also provides a one-year extension of
time "[i]n cases in which fraud, concealment or intentional mis-
representation prevented discovery of the injury within the two-
year period." 133
V. THE CONTINUING TREATMENT RULE
While the Supreme Court of Virginia has firmly adhered to the
rule that the statute of limitations will begin to run upon the ac-
crual of the cause of action (right of action), regardless of a plain-
tiffs ignorance of the injury, potential claimants can find some
solace in the continuing treatment rule. Since at least 1900, Vir-
ginia has followed the general rule that "where there is an under-
taking or agency which requires a continuation of services, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run ... until the termina-
tion of the undertaking or agency."' 34 Later dubbed the "continu-
ing treatment" rule,'35 or the "continuous representation rule,"
136
131. Id.
132. Id. § 8.01-243(C)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
133. Id. § 8.01-243(C)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006) (resolving the problems
raised by the court's decision in Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966)); see
also Johnson v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. Cir. 311, 322-23 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Stafford County)
(applying Virginia Military Institute v. King, 217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977), in a
medical malpractice action). Courts have refused to expand Virginia's discovery rule be-
yond those areas explicitly allowed by statute. See, e.g., Herman v. McCarthy Enters., Inc.,
61 Va. Cir. 697, 698-99 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Loudoun County) (holding that Virginia's discov-
ery rule has not been extended to cases arising under the Virginia Consumer Protection
Act).
134. Riverview Land Co. v. Dance & Co., 98 Va. 239, 244, 35 S.E. 720, 722 (1900).
135. Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 979, 252 S.E.2d 594, 600 (1979).
136. Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495, 505, 593 S.E.2d 319, 324 (2004).
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the principle applies to breaches of duty arising from relation-
ships wherein a client entrusts an agent with "a continuing series
of transactions, or a single but long-protracted transaction."
137
The Supreme Court of Virginia has applied the continuing
treatment rule in a variety of cases, including actions for legal
and medical malpractice. The court first employed the doctrine in
the context of legal malpractice in 1987 in Keller v. Denny.3 ' In
Keller, the court held that:
[Wihen malpractice is claimed to have occurred during the represen-
tation of a client by an attorney with respect to a particular under-
taking or transaction, the breach of contract or duty occurs and the
statute of limitations begins to run when the attorney's services ren-
dered in connection with that particular undertaking or transaction
have terminated, notwithstanding the continuation of a general at-
torney-client relationship, and irrespective of the attorney's work on
other undertakings or transactions for the same client. 139
Underlying the court's adoption of the continuing treatment
rule in Keller was the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. As the court noted several years earlier, the relationship
between attorney and client is "one which commands the highest
fidelity to a most solemn trust, for the lawyer is the expert and
the client is utterly dependent upon his knowledge, his skill, and
his honor." 4 °
The Keller court made clear that the continuing treatment or
representation rule applies "only when a continuous or recurring
course of professional services relating to a particular undertak-
ing is shown to have taken place over a period of time."' 4 ' There-
fore, the court determined that "[t]he proper inquiry is not
whether a general attorney-client relationship has ended, but in-
stead, when the attorney's work on the particular undertaking at
issue has ceased." 14
2
137. Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 516, 352 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1987).
138. Id. at 518, 352 S.E.2d at 330.
139. Id.
140. Allied Prods., Inc. v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 767, 232 S.E.2d 774, 776-77
(1977).
141. Keller, 232 Va. at 518, 352 S.E.2d at 331.
142. Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495, 505, 593 S.E.2d 319, 324 (2004) (noting the court's
decision in Keller). In Keller, the court further distinguished such long-term services from
individual acts of negligence, noting that, for single, isolated acts, Virginia Code section
8.01-230 "dictates that the statute of limitations begins to run when that act is performed,
regardless of the time of its discovery." 232 Va. at 518-19, 352 S.E.2d at 331.
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The court has similarly applied the continuing treatment rule
to medical malpractice actions, noting that the rule applies only
to a continuous course of improper examination or treatment that
is substantially uninterrupted, and not to a single, isolated act of
negligence."' The court has been careful to note, however, that
the continuing treatment rule does not assert that a defendant's
negligence continued for the duration of the relationship.
4 4
Rather, the rule provides that a plaintiff-patient can wait until
the end of a continuing physician-patient relationship to bring an
action for negligence that has occurred during that treatment. 1
45
In applying the continuing treatment rule to medical malprac-
tice actions, the Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized that,
while on one hand it may be unjust to require a physician to be
prepared to defend himself for alleged acts of negligence that oc-
curred from the beginning of a long-term relationship, it is
equally unjust to "penaliz[e] a plaintiff patient who, under long-
continued treatment, had the right to assume that due care and
skill would be exercised."'46 Therefore, part of the rationale for
the use of the rule in medical malpractice actions is that plaintiff-
patients would otherwise have to bring suit for alleged negligence
while the defendant-physician was attempting to affect a cure.
1 47
As the court notes, "[P]ermitting a patient to wait until the ter-
mination of treatment before being required to file suit [is] condu-
cive to mutual confidence between physician and patient because
it [gives] the physician all reasonable time and opportunity to cor-
rect mistakes made at the beginning of a course of treatment."48
It is crucial to note that the continuing treatment rule does not
provide the plaintiff a detour around the limitations of the dis-
covery rule. Rather, the tolling effects of the rule only serve to ex-
143. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Rawls, 235 Va. 607, 612, 369 S.E.2d 683, 686 (1988). Virginia
circuit courts have followed suit, applying the continuing treatment rule in medical mal-
practice actions. See, e.g., Crockett v. Waller-Smith, 63 Va. Cir. 562, 564 (Cir. Ct. 2004)
(Roanoke City); Dixon v. Messer, 61 Va. Cir. 527, 528 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Norfolk City). Courts
have similarly applied the rule in actions against chiropractors, Taylor Chiropractic
Clinic, Ltd. v. Gupton, 10 Va. Cir. 227, 229 (Cir. Ct. 1987) (Colonial Heights City), and
dentists, Burgess v. Anderson, 9 Va. Cir. 435, 436 (Cir. Ct. 1979) (Richmond City). Courts
have refused, however, to extend application of the doctrine to pharmacists. See, e.g.,
Coakley v. Orr, 6 Va. Cir. 170, 171-72 (Cir. Ct. 1984) (Loudoun County).
144. Grubbs, 235 Va. at 611-12, 369 S.E.2d at 686.
145. Id.
146. Keller, 232 Va. at 517, 352 S.E.2d at 330.
147. Grubbs, 235 Va. at 611, 369 S.E.2d at 686.
148. Id. at 611-12, 369 S.E.2d at 686.
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tend the plaintiffs right of action for the time during which a par-
ticular illness should have been diagnosed or reasonable care
should have been given for the particular breach and harm giving
rise to the particular cause of action.'49 Similarly, as one com-
mentator notes, "[C]ontinuous treatment is not the equivalent of
a wrong that goes unremedied for a long period" of time. 150 That
is, when a defendant violates some contractual duty to the plain-
tiff and makes no attempt to cure his breach, a cause of action ac-
crues and the statute of limitations begins to run despite the in-
cidental existence of a continuing relationship.'5 1 Finally, the
continuing treatment rule will not apply where a relationship
may be divided into distinct contractual pieces. 5 2 In such cases,
the court will look to each part and each breach as individual
causes of action, with the appropriate statute of limitations be-
ginning accordingly.' 53
VI. CONCLUSION
In any civil action, an understanding of accrual and the appli-
cable statute of limitations is as indispensable as the elements of
the particular cause of action being asserted. As this article has
illustrated, however, the determination of these crucial facts may
not always be a simple one. Although the Virginia practitioner
must grapple with the long-standing distinction between the
cause of action and the right of action, resolution of this question
may only be the first step in determining when an action must be
brought. As discussed above, it will often be necessary to deter-
mine whether a cause of action sounds in tort or contract. Once
this determination is made, an attorney must also consider
whether the continuing treatment rule or a limited discovery rule
will apply to prolong the accrual of the cause of action and the
running of the statute of limitations.
149. See Justice v. Natvig, 238 Va. 178, 180, 381 S.E.2d 8, 9 (1989).
150. SINCLAIR & MIDDLEDITCH, supra note 4, § 4.11, at 233.
151. See id. (citing Westminster Investing Corp. v. Lamps Unlimited, Inc., 237 Va. 543,
379 S.E.2d 316 (1989)).
152. Id. at 233-34.
153. Id. (citing Nelson v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 228, 368 S.E.2d 239 (1988)). Simi-
larly, if the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action leaves the care of the defendant phy-
sician, the physician-patient relationship is terminated and the plaintiff can not rely on
the continuing treatment rule to extend the time for his or her right of action. Bennett v.
Clark, 69 F. Supp. 2d 809, 812 (E.D. Va. 1999).
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Following the court's edict that there is no right of action until
there is a cause of action,' it is clear that the importance of this
multi-faceted accrual analysis cannot be overstated. If there is no
right of action, the injured party is left without recourse in the
courts. Far from simply academic questions left to journals or
classrooms, the concepts of accrual and statutes of limitations
serve as indispensable prerequisites to any civil action and their
comprehension as necessary obligations in the diligent represen-
tation of clients.
154. Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 13, 168 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1969) ("A right
of action cannot accrue until there is a cause of action.").
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